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Introduction  
Turbulent environments, international competition, economic and technological pressures force the modern 
organization to rapidly adapt to changing conditions. As a consequence, networked, adhocratic, team-
based, and dispersed architectures emerge (Keen, 1991; Drucker, 1988, Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 
1987). Similarly, uncertain market conditions and the need for high efforts in R&D lead organizations to a 
variety of inter-organizational relationships, such as alliances, partnerships, joint-ventures and research 
consortia (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Both tendencies emphasize the organizational shift toward 
horizontal mechanisms of coordination, where communication and cooperation take precedence over 
predefined vertical lines of authority and discrete market transactions.  
Information Technology (IT) is regarded as a critical enabler of new ways of organizing (DeSanctis and 
Jackson, 1994). In particular communication media supported by electronic networks facilitate the 
emergence of fluid and flexible patterns of working relations, giving rise to innovative contexts for 
interactions and collaborative work that span traditional organizational boundaries.  
However, despite the potential for communication offered by IT, "networked organizations are not the 
same as electronic networks nor-perhaps-can they be built entirely on them" (Nohria and Eccles, 1992). 
Working relations in the networked organization are intrinsically embedded in a social context made of 
culture, social norms, practices, habits, and expectations (Zack and McKenney, 1995). These elements are 
primarily shaped by ongoing face-to-face interactions. Electronic networks might complement existing 
face-to-face relations. The extent to which networks developed through face-to-face interactions might 
become synonymous to networks of computer-supported relations is an issue that needs to be explored. 
This research is an attempt to shed some light on this issue, with a specific focus on the relation between 
electronic-mail and cooperation.  
The following research question has been addressed: to what extent can computer-mediated communication 
support spontaneous mechanisms of mutual adjustment and trust building that are essential for the 
development of stable cooperation?  
The investigation has been conducted using an interpretive approach (Lee, 1991). The relation between 
cooperation and communication has been observed in a laboratory setting. The exploration focused on how 
members of different social groups enacted their particular reality and developed values of trust supporting 
a stable cooperation in face-to-face versus computer-mediated communication contexts. An important 
characteristic is that every group, composed of six participants, was selected to minimize the existence of 
prior acquaintances among members of the same groups. This manipulation permitted to control a crucial 
stage of group life, such as group formation, and analyze how the context of group formation impacts on 
group cooperation. 
Group Formation: the hypothesis of transferability of trust  
Social context becomes essential to the success of cooperation from the earlier stages of group formation. 
The process of socialization that takes place at the individual level through the modeling and learning of 
roles among group members (Schein, 1978) has profound effects on how the individual sees the world. 
Once within a role, the person is more likely to see in terms of "us vs. them," with a favored in-group of 
similar role-holders (us) and an out-group of different roles holders (them). However, attention must be 
given to the communication context where socialization takes place. As Drexler and Sibbet indicate in their 
7-stage model (Johnson, 1991), face-to-face meetings are irreplaceable in the earliest stages of orientation 
and trust building by IT, while audio and video-conferences, voice-mail and electronic-mail become helpful 
tools in the following stages of goal/role clarification, commitment, implementation, high performance.  
Using this model, the following hypothesis has been investigated: face-to-face interactions enable group 
formation, providing elements such as group identity, values, and history, which are essential to the 
emergence of mutual trust. Once established, trust supports cooperative efforts even if the group meeting 
place is a purely electronic context. 
Method  
Following the interpretive approach (Lee, 1991; 1995) the research analyzed communication and 
cooperation as context-dependent phenomena, which meanings can mainly be understood from the 
participants' perspective. The study employed ethnographic techniques, including communication protocols 
review, observation of experimental groups and structured and semi-structured questionnaires.  
The experiment Every experiment consisted of a repetition of a complete information, 6-person game for 
28 rounds (Ostrom et al., 1992). During each round of the experiment participants faced a paradigmatic 
problem of cooperation, called social dilemma (Dawes, 1980). The dilemma referred to the individual 
choice that participants made whether to cooperate in order to contribute to a common goal or to free ride 
on the rest of the group's effort to reach the goal. Concretely this individual choice consisted of a number 
indicating the level of contribution to the common goal. Individuals were rewarded by a fraction of the 
collective good minus the cost of contribution. Participants knew that cooperation would be more 
rewarding for everybody if and only if everybody cooperated. However, at the individual level defection 
always offered the higher payoff. As no superior form of control characterized the game, nobody should 
sacrifice her or himself to contribute to the common goal. As a consequence the theory predicts the failure 
of cooperation where nobody can benefit from the common goal because nobody contributes to it. 
Complete information implied that at the end of each round each participant was given information about: 
1. her or his own payoff in the previous rounds of the game, and 2. overall group level of contribution. The 
second type of information permitted every participant to monitor group cooperation. Participants were 
rewarded by a monetary function reflecting their individual payoff in the game (detailed exercise 
description available on request).  
Experimental Settings Despite the pessimistic theoretical prediction based upon the perfect rationality of 
human beings, the broad experimental literature in social dilemma shows that face-to-face (F2F) 
communication has powerful effects on cooperation (Sally, 1995). One of the main finding is that 
communication allows participants to develop trust and, ultimately, to enhance a stable cooperation. On the 
basis of this experimental evidence, the game was interrupted three times. A communication episode was 
introduced after the 10th, 15th and 20th rounds of the game.  
The impact of communication on cooperation was investigated in three different experimental settings. 
Each setting is distinguished by a specific communication context.  
I. F2F communication (3 experiments) Subjects engaged in a 10-minute F2F round table discussion, per 
communication episode. A hidden camera recorded each communication episode.  
II. CMC (6 experiments) Subjects engaged in a 30-minute CMC conversation, per communication 
episode. A mailing list supported the CMC round table. No message anonymity was permitted and every 
message was made public through the list. Each message was recorded in a file.  
III. CMC with prior F2F interaction (3 experiments) Three groups were exposed to a separate treatment 
the day before facing the social dilemma in a CMC context. The treatment consisted of a classic group 
formation exercise used in training sessions (description available upon request). Multiple questionnaires 
and communication protocol analysis assessed and confirmed the success of the group formation treatment. 
Results  
Homogeneous and interesting results emerged within every experimental setting. In the I and III settings 
participants were able to enhance a stable cooperation, respectively from the first and the second 
communication episodes, to the end of the game. In both settings communication supported group 
convergence toward a cooperative agreement and development of trust necessary to implement such 
agreements. The slight delay in cooperation enhancement in the III setting was mainly due to lack of 
experience in the use of electronic-mail, rather than to lack of trust. In general, this result confirmed the 
hypothesis on transferability of trust from a F2F to a CMC context. Conversely, in the II experimental 
setting cooperation collapsed. Participants were able to define agreements but communication did not 
support the development of trust. Therefore, after each communication episode one or two participants 
started to defect and their behavior triggered increasing "waves of defection" as the game moved far from 
the latest communication episode. In some cases frustration deriving from the impossibility to trust each 
other led to the explicit agreement not to cooperate.  
In order to understand these results the interpretive analysis focused on those phenomena that more likely 
reflected which meanings, beliefs and intentions participants enacted in every experimental setting and that, 
ultimately, marked the success or the failure of cooperation. The following interpretation is mainly based 
on the analysis of communication protocols recorded during every communication episode. The analysis 
identified three communication activities: brainstorming (generation of individual ideas), consensus 
convergence (idea clarification, negotiation on alternatives and final definition of the agreement), and 
social enforcement (definition of and respect for collective norms). Brainstorming is measured by the 
number of generated solutions, level of participation, speed in problem solving. Consensus converge is 
analyzed through the number and content of threads of communication, leadership (variance of 
interventions), and number of subscribers to the agreement. Social enforcement is observed through the 
type of collective norms of behavior, number of threats, flames, and bluffs. Communication activity 
outcomes for each experimental setting are summarized in figure 1.  
 experimental settings 
 I II III 
brainstorming low high high 
consensus 
convergence high low high 
social 
enforcement high low high 
fig. 1. Communication activity outcomes in the three experimental settings. 
In general, brainstorming was better in the CMC context (II and III setting), in terms of more homogeneous 
participation to the discussion, higher number of generated and compared solutions, speed in the 
individuation of the best group solution. In the I setting brainstorming was poorer because the discussion 
was dominated by a few participants and the groups converged on the first proposed solution. As a 
consequence only groups in the CMC context could optimally solve the problem during the first 
communication phase.  
On the other hand, consensus convergence and social enforcement were weaker in the II setting and this 
seems to explain why cooperation did not hold. Communication structure was characterized by many and 
chaotic threads, implying lack of organization and coherence in the group conversation. Moreover, the 
absence of a leader and the existence of many alternatives for agreement forced participants to vote in a 
messy way. Participants did not define any collective rule of behavior. They threatened defection in 
response to defection. Frustration for the disorganized communication activity and for the failure of 
cooperation fed a vicious circle of threats, flaming and bluffs.  
The I and III settings show many similarities regarding the consensus convergence and social enforcement 
dimensions. In the I setting, cues such as leadership, organized communication and unanimity about the 
agreement supported the convergence to the consensus. Trust was enacted from the beginning of the game, 
when participants stated the need to cooperate also if eventual defection emerges, as main behavioral rules. 
Similarly, in the III setting, despite problems of coordination during the first communication episode, 
subjects learned how to communicate effectively by electronic mail. A cooperation-supportive social 
context was enacted by statements of cooperation, absence of complaints about the initial chaotic message 
flow, and absence of threats and flaming.  
The overall results lead to the following interpretation. Cooperation held only in those cases in which 
participants saw themselves as members of a group and were, therefore, prone to sacrifice a pure rational 
behavior for the sake of group trust. Participants' responses to questionnaires and the content analysis of 
communication protocols show that this phenomenon happened in the I and III settings. In particular, in the 
III setting cues, such as answering each others' questions, frequent use of the pronoun "us" rather than 
"anyone" or "you", and emphasis on the concept of "our interest" characterized the flow of messages. It 
seems that participants imported their social identity as a group from the previous F2F interaction. In the II 
setting communication itself as a collaborative task failed. As a consequence communication did not 
support the process of socialization necessary to develop group formation and trust, and participants ended 
up competing like independent market agents rather than cooperating like members of a group. 
Conclusion  
Despite the limited number of experiments, the research provides theoretical and practical insights. On the 
theoretical side, the research offered experimental support to the argument that richness is not an invariant 
property of the communication medium, but its effectiveness depends on components of the social context, 
like trust, shared values and pre-existing group identity. The finding that trust can be transferred from a 
face-to-face to a computer-mediated context confirmed the hypothesis on transferability of trust. It implies 
that face-to-face communication might acquire a necessary and symbolic role in the emerging virtual 
organization, sustaining important elements to elicit and enhance cooperation, such as history, routine, 
norms, social relationships, and shared behavioral and interpretive contexts (McKenney et al, 1992). The 
implication for practice is that CMC technologies can not be optimally used without complementing them 
with face-to-face meetings. The experiments showed that activities such as brainstorming can be more 
effective using CMC technologies. However the integration of face-to-face and CMC interactions might 
optimize group performance along the entire process of decision making and cooperation. Face-to-face 
episodes should be introduced to support critical stages of group life, including group formation and 
renewal, before performing cooperative tasks in electronic contexts. 
References available upon request.  
 
